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CHAPTER 5
Using Evidence in a Highly Fragmented 




This chapter examines how evidence is used in major policy health policy 
initiatives in a highly contested political context. Through a case study of 
legislation proposed in the context of Colombia’s ongoing health systems 
reformed process, it explores how such use is affected by the specific role 
played by the legislature within a highly fragmented polity. We use an 
institutionalist framework to identify three concentric layers of fragmenta-
tion: at the social, political and administrative levels. The former refers to 
macro levels social structures and factors shaping Colombian society and 
politics, including the ongoing armed conflict as associated social cleav-
ages which have loomed over Colombian society for decades. At the sec-
ond level, Colombian politics is characterised by deep divisions and 
political cleavages along party lines, coupled with weak party structures. 
This results in a highly fluid political terrain in which new parties may 
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quickly emerge and disintegrate, and are often held together by ‘political 
strongmen’ around which actors coalesce. At the administrative level, the 
weakness of the legislative and executive branches and corruption endemic 
in Colombian politics lead to further fragmentation and inefficiency in 
decision making with the judiciary stepping into the power vacuum to 
address the most pressing health systems issues (Hawkins and Alvarez 
Rosete 2017).
The role of the Colombian legislature in the health policy process has to 
be understood against this challenging backdrop of its recent political and 
societal history. In the last decade, Colombia’s democracy began the long 
and difficult process of addressing and moving beyond deeply embedded 
political and societal conflicts in the form of terrorism, internal armed con-
flict, the illicit drug trade, clientelism and political corruption, which collec-
tively led to the “partial collapse” of the state in the late 1980s (Bejarano and 
Pizarro 2002). This was reflected in Colombia’s low ranking in the World 
Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGIs) project on “Political 
Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism”, “Rule of Law” and “Voice 
and Accountability”.1 However, in September 2016, the World Bank presi-
dent Jim Yong Kim welcomed advances in the peace process aimed at ending 
the internal armed conflicts, stating that “the country is closer than ever to 
putting an end to this vicious cycle, and to starting the long and challenging 
process of transformation and territorial development” (Kim 2016).
1 The Worldwide Governance Indicators project reports aggregate and individual gover-
nance indicators for over 200 countries over the period 1996–2015, for six dimensions of 
governance: Voice and Accountability; Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism; 
Government Effectiveness; Regulatory Quality; Rule of Law; and Control of Corruption.
“Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism” captures perceptions of the likeli-
hood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent 
means, including politically-motivated violence and terrorism. In this dimension, Colombia 
scored a percentile rank of: 8.2 (1996), 0.97 (2003), 12.3 (2011) and 12.38 (2015).
“Rule of Law” captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and 
abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property 
rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. In this 
dimension, Colombia scored a percentile rank of: 22.01 (1996), 26.32 (2003), 47.42 
(2011) and 44.71 (2015).
“Voice and Accountability” captures perceptions of the extent to which a country’s citi-
zens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, 
freedom of association, and a free media. Percentile ranks indicate the country’s rank among 
all countries covered by the aggregate indicator, with 0 corresponding to lowest rank, and 
100 to highest rank. In “Voice and Accountability”, Colombia scored a percentile rank of: 
29.33 (1996), 34.13 (2003), 46.48 (2011) and 45.81 (2015).
See http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#reports
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Despite these improvements in recent years, analysts have argued that 
the various threats faced by Colombia have undermined the legitimacy of 
state institutions. This in turn can explain much of the current configura-
tion of Colombian politics and the poor institutional performance of key 
bodies, including the legislature, which has been characterised as highly 
fragmented and decentralized (Pachón and Johnson 2016; Botero et al. 
2010; Bejarano and Pizarro 2002).
The chapter examines evidence use in a fragmented and conflict-riven 
political environment such as Colombia, focussing on the long-standing 
and highly politicised attempts to reform the Colombian health system. It 
shows that policy relevant evidence has consistently been used to inform 
and provide the rationale for draft laws submitted to Congress over the 
period of the reforms and appropriate and robust research had indeed 
entered onto policy making agenda and was cited in the legislation exam-
ined. However, reflecting the role of the legislature in the highly contested 
political system and the health policy subsystem, evidence was not able to 
change actors´ initial positions and opinions and thus, political consensus 
on the direction of reforms could not be forged on the basis of the evi-
dence cited. Thus while the importance of evidence to both the substance 
and politics of the proposed reforms was acknowledged, the inability of 
policy relevant evidence to overcome political divisions and form the basis 
of political compromise and consensus is also clear. The analysis presented 
here supports the conclusion that, in highly contested and fragmented 
political environments, evidence tends to be secondary to other political 
and ideological factors influencing policy change. The chapter focuses on 
the reform process of the Colombian health system and the uptake of 
research within draft laws submitted to the Colombian Parliament between 
1993 and 2016.
Methodology
This chapter draws on data generated from an analysis of draft laws which 
are available in the public domain as well as from data gathered from semi- 
structured interviews with policy actors in Colombia. As in many countries, 
Colombia has a hierarchical legal structure with the constitution on top, 
followed by laws produced by the Congress, which can be Statutory laws 
(leyes estatutarias), Organic laws (leyes orgánicas) and Ordinary laws (leyes 
ordinarias) (Vanegas 2012). Any draft law in Colombia has to have an 
introductory preamble (exposición de motivos) which explains the nature and 
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scope of the problem that it aims to tackle, reviews the regulatory gap that 
it aims to fill and presents the broad content of the law. It is in the introduc-
tory preamble of draft laws where research, if it has been reviewed to formu-
late the policy proposal, will be referred to. Thus, an analysis of the evidence 
cited in the introductory preambles allows us to examine whether research 
evidence has been at all up taken during the policy formulation phase and 
the body of research which had informed the wider policy debates.
As detailed in Annex 1, 62 draft laws were identified and selected which 
were then reviewed independently by the present authors of this chapter 
to assess whether they cited evidence to sustain their policy proposals and, 
if so, which type of evidence was considered. The criteria used for this 
assessment was whether the draft law included: (i) data produced by gov-
ernment and its agencies and/or academic studies to consistently define 
the nature and scope of the problem; and/or (ii) existing national and 
international research (i.e. international organizations reports, research 
published in peer-review journals, etc.) to sustain policy proposals. This 
research, however, did not seek to evaluate the “quality” of the evidence 
considered and eventually taken up in the draft laws.
We conducted a total of 26 interviews in Colombia in February 2014. 
Respondents included policy advisers and civil servants at the national 
level, interest groups representatives, academics, health policy experts and 
commentators. Through the interviews, we sought to understand the 
structure and of recent health policy debates in the country and the type 
of evidence discussed within the policy making processes. In particular, we 
sought to identify the factors and conditions which helped or hindered the 
use of evidence to inform those decisions. Interview responses were trian-
gulated with the analysis of draft laws described above and a wider review 
of relevant policy reports and government documents. To ensure anonym-
ity of respondents we refer to interviews by number. Where it is essential 
to the understanding or evidentiary weight of quotations, the sector from 
which respondents came will be detailed. Quotes in Spanish from the 
interviews and from other bibliographical sources were translated into 
English by the authors.
the role of the legIslature In coloMbIa
The current institutional configuration of the Colombian state is defined 
by the Constitution of 1991. Colombia is a presidential system in which 
the President of the Republic is elected directly by the citizens for a set 
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period of four years. The Colombian Parliament is formed of a bicameral 
Congress with a Senate (Senado), and a Chamber of Representatives 
(Cámara de Representantes), elected also for a four year period via a pro-
portional representation system. The political party system is weak: parties 
do not have strong bureaucracies and structures, and are dependent 
instead upon individual leaders who act as figureheads, tying together oth-
erwise loosely connected political allegiances. Under the current 
Constitution, the two-party system that had dominated politics prior to 
the 1990s was replaced by a highly fragmented, multi-party system, with 
later reforms, in 2003, aimed at reducing this fragmentation. The present 
system is characterised not only by weak party structures (with parties 
serving as electoral vehicles for candidates to promote their own personal 
agendas), but by high electoral volatility, whereby new parties frequently 
emerge but often cease to exist in one or two elections cycles (Botero et al. 
2011; Milanese 2011; Pachón and Johnson 2016).
Within this institutional architecture, what is the role of the legislature 
in the policy process in Colombia? Saiegh (2010) has suggested a number 
of factors that can drive a legislature’s policymaking role: (a) the extent of 
its formal powers; (b) the amount of political space/discretion afforded by 
other power holders, mainly the Executive branch; (c) the capacity 
afforded by its procedures, structures and support; and (d) the goals of 
members and leaders of the legislature body itself. The following section 
explores how these factors combine to grant a specific role to the 
Colombian legislature in policy making.
First, the Colombia legislature performs both traditional parliamentary 
roles of developing legislation and scrutinizing government through both 
chambers of Congress  – the Senate (Senado), and the Chamber of 
Representatives (Cámara de Representantes)  – which have largely sym-
metrical roles and powers. Each chamber is divided into a number of com-
missions which deal with specific policy matters. For example, the First 
Commissions of Senate and Chamber of Representatives deal with ‘consti-
tutional, ethnic and peace’ matters, while the Seventh Commissions of 
Senate and Chamber of Representatives discuss ‘health, social security, 
housing’ issues, etc. New draft laws are registered in one of the Chambers 
or in both (twin projects) and are allocated to a specific Committee of that 
Chamber for analysis and discussion.2
2 At registering in Congress, the project law receives a number, which different for each 
chamber, and thus is known by such code, the year of registration and a S or C letter depend-
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Second, regarding the power of the legislature vis-à-vis the President of 
the Republic, the 1991 “constitution strengthened the checks and bal-
ances of the political system in an effort to endow political institutions 
with greater legitimacy after decades of limited participation and low rep-
resentation” (Cárdenas et al. 2008: 202). This meant that “the president 
lost some capacity as an agenda-setter relative to the previous period, while 
congress and the constitutional court gained relative power” (Cárdenas 
et al. 2008: 202). However, the President of the Republic in Colombia 
continues to be extremely powerful within the Colombian system; enjoy-
ing several key powers to influence the legislation and the wider political 
process (including urgency message; legislative decrees; capacity to veto 
Congress projects; freedom to initiate laws in key policy areas, which are 
detailed below) (Saiegh 2010). The role of the President was further 
strengthened during the administration of President Álvaro Uribe Vélez 
(2002–2010), who succeeded in pushing through reforms to allow him 
(and future Presidents) to be re-elected for a second term. Among Latin 
American countries, Colombia (together with Chile, Brazil and Ecuador) 
grants the greatest legislative powers to presidents vis-a-vis legislatures 
(Saiegh 2010). However, the position of the President (and by extension, 
the executive) versus the legislative branch should not be overstated 
(Saiegh 2010). It is not “imperial presidency” but rather “limited central-
ism” (Milanese 2011) as the President is obliged to seek compromises 
with parliamentarians in order to secure the passage of legislation.
Third, law making processes in Colombia are highly institutionalised. 
All laws, must undergo the same basic process. The first step is that the 
draft law is published in the official congress bulletin (Gaceta del Congreso). 
The process starts either in the Senate or in the Chamber of Representatives, 
depending on which chamber the draft was first registered. This first 
debate occurs in the permanent commission of the chamber after which it 
is voted on. If it’s approved it moves on to the plenary of the chambers. 
Once the plenary has approved the draft is sent to the remaining  chamber’s 
permanent commission to be debated, voted and if successful, passed to 
the plenary. If there are differences between the approved texts in each 
chamber, a conciliatory draft is produced by an appointed group c onsisting 
ing on whether it refers to the Senate or the Chamber of Representatives. For example, the 
Statutory Law Project (Proyecto Ley Estatutaria, PLE) registration in Senate was 
PLE209/2013S and its Congress twin-project is PLE267/2013C – this is represented in 
this chapter in the following way: PLE209/2013S [+ PLE267/2013C].
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of an equal number of members of each chamber. Finally, the draft requires 
the President’s signature to enter into law. In the case of statutory laws 
(and those issued under any of the extraordinary procedures), review by 
the Constitutional Court is required before the President’s signature.
The regulations governing Congress allow for a series of extraordinary 
procedures to deal with specific situations. One of them is an “urgency 
message” whereby the President requests a higher priority be assigned to a 
draft law in an expedited process which should last no more than 30 days 
in each Chamber. The procedure means deliberation and voting on the 
proposed law are conducted jointly between the Commissions of the Senate 
and the Chamber of Representatives. Then, the draft statutory law is voted 
separately by each Chamber on a plenary session. A final “conciliatory” 
draft is produced and reviewed by the Constitutional Court to confirm that 
the legislation enacted is compatible with the Constitution, before being 
signed into by the President of the Republic. The high turnover of MPs 
and the weak party structures limit the institutional knowledge and techni-
cal capacity of the legislative branch in Colombia (Scartascini 2008: 47). 
There is very low party discipline and party leaders have only limited con-
trol of the legislative agenda (Pachón and Johnson 2016).
Finally, one of the most prominent elements of Colombia’s legislature 
is the “personalist” nature of political candidacies (Pachón and Hoskin 
2011), in which political parties serve mainly as conduits for prominent 
individuals, in a system favouring ‘client’ relations over partisan identities 
(Saiegh 2010; Milanese 2011; Pachón and Johnson 2016; also confirmed 
in interviews). Often, this involves prioritizing what Pachón and Johnson 
(2016) have called “distributive pork-barrel projects”: obtaining resources 
to benefit the constituency that gets them elected (see also Milanese 
2011). Saiegh (2010) highlights in addition that “legislators orientate 
towards satisfying narrow geographic interests”. National policy makers 
are discouraged from making radical reforms through Congress which 
may affected established networks of vested interest and reforms are 
instead passed incrementally through executive decrees [Interview 8] or 
brought about through rulings of the Constitutional Court on the provi-
sion of health services (see Hawkins and Alvarez Rosete 2017).
The core of the legislature’s activity is also not directed by party groups 
but by the Commissions of the Chamber of Representatives and the Senate, 
which are not under the control of party leaders but exercise significant 
control over the Congressional agenda (Pachón and Johnson 2016). Since 
the Commissions in Colombia constitute the first stage of bill approval, 
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they “can prevent bills from ever getting to the floor. This contrasts with 
the situation of most legislatures in Latin America, in which committees 
only advise the floor with positive or negative reports” (Pachón and 
Johnson 2016: 73). Thus, legislators seek election to key Commissions, i.e. 
those which allocate resources or which play key gatekeeping functions, 
such as Commissions I of the Congress and the Senate in ballots held 
amongst parliamentarians on the first day of the legislature term (Pachón 
and Johnson 2016). This may mean competing for seats with members of 
the same party while getting support from other political groups, and again 
reflects the personalist, highly fragmented and decentralised nature of the 
Colombian legislature. Consequently, the Colombian legislature is not an 
arena which facilitates consensus building and constructive approaches to 
policymaking, with clear implications for evidence use.
coloMbIa’s hIghly contested health  
PolIcy subsysteM
The divisions and fragmentation in Colombian society and politics are 
reflected in its health policy debates. The health system has suffered from 
a lack of fundamental consensus over its most basic organising principles 
and structures since its inception with the passage of Law 100 in 1993. 
This lack of consensus has continued throughout the almost constant pro-
cess of reform which the system has undergone. Despite successive pro-
posals for reform, high levels of political contestation have resulted in 
policy stasis. Deep ideological disagreements have been sustained on issues 
such as the financing of the system (insurance versus taxation based mod-
els); the involvement of private sector providers; and whether limits should 
be placed to the right to health care. This reform process reflects in part 
the role played by competing coalitions of actors present within the 
Colombian health sector, and their various attempts to shape the health 
system in ways amenable to their underlying interests and values. We have 
analysed elsewhere the interactions between three principal coalitions of 
actors involved in the health system reform process in the context of 
Colombia’s antagonistic politics (Hawkins and Alvarez Rosete 2017; 
Álvarez and Hawkins 2018).
It is possible to identify two key phases in the health system reform 
process. In the first phase (1993–2010), a “dominant” coalition of gov-
ernment technocrats, congressmen, insurance companies, the financial 
sector and the private health providers (including the pharmaceutical 
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companies) emerged and was able to shape the health policy agenda. 
Between 2003 and 2009, under the administration of President Uribe, a 
set of actors began to emerge which sought to challenge the dominant 
coalition but were not at this juncture effectively coordinated as a coali-
tion of actors, and so no solid agreements on a shared policy agenda 
between different groups were reached.
The second phase began under the current Presidency of Juan Manuel 
Santos in 2010 and is still ongoing. This chapter analyses the period up to 
2016. A gradual coalescing of actors into distinct advocacy coalitions, 
increasingly coordinated and mobilised around shared beliefs and policy 
solutions, began to challenge those of the “dominant coalition”. The emer-
gence of “challenging” coalitions occurred in parallel with the weakening of 
the “dominant coalition” and the gradually weakening relationships between 
this coalition and successive Ministers of Health. However, as the recent 
passage of Statutory Law 1751 – which confirmed the principles and values 
of the existing health system, whilst clarifying the rights and responsibilities 
of patients – demonstrated, the two challenger coalitions of actors have not 
been powerful enough to override the hegemony of the dominant coalition 
and cross-coalition agreements have not been achieved.
evIdence use In the fIrst Phase of health  
reforM (1992–2010)
Law 100 of 1993, which set up the current health system, was passed dur-
ing the government of President César Gaviria (1990–1994), in the con-
text of a wider programme of the state reforms, which included the 
enactment of a new constitution in July 1991 (Vega-Vargas et al. 2012; 
González-Rosetti and Bossert 2000; Jaramillo 1998). As mentioned 
above, these political reforms had strengthened the power of Congress, so 
that it was able to impose policy initiatives on the Executive, including 
health reforms (González-Rosetti and Bossert 2000: 24). As González- 
Rosetti and Bossert comment (2000: 26): “The health reform was not 
part of [President Gaviria’s] initial policy agenda, which focused on the 
social security reform. Instead, it was the concession the Executive had to 
make to Congress in order to have the pension reform approved.” Indeed, 
the first version of Project Law PL155/1992S submitted to Senate by the 
Executive in September 1992 (and its twin draft law in the Chamber of 
Representatives PL204/1992C), which eventually became Law 100 later 
in 1993, proposed reforms of the pension system but did not include 
health, so Commission VII of the Senate vetoed the draft and requested 
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the government to adopt a comprehensive approach to social security 
reform which also included the health system (Uribe 2009). At that time, 
the Minister of Health was Gustavo de Roux, who belonged to the centre- 
left party the Alianza Democrática M-19 and whose ideas on the health 
reforms were not aligned with President Gaviria’s view.
In November 1992, de Roux was replaced by Juan Luis Londoño, who 
had been deputy director of the National Planning Department 
(Departamento Nacional de Planeación) and who assembled a small group 
of national experts to take the reform task forward, supported by the 
group of international consultants of the Colombia Health Sector Reform 
Project of the Harvard School of Public Health (Bossert et al. 1998). In 
that same month, Londoño submitted to Congress an addition to 
PL155/1992S which proposed the setting up of a subsidised health 
scheme for the poor; but it was again vetoed by the Commission VII of 
the Senate, which argued again that this was only a partial reform to the 
health sector (Uribe 2009).
Thus, the process of negotiations on different policy options started 
again and a number of parties and pressure groups presented legislative 
projects during the first months of 1993 (Uribe 2009). These proposals 
were considered by a group of experts, which, under the coordination of 
Londoño’s team, produced a new version of PL155/1992S, which was 
registered in Congress in April 1993. As Glassman et al. (2009: 7) state, 
with this proposal “[t]he administration committed to accelerating the 
expansion of subsidized health insurance for the poor; developing a pro-
gram to support the redesign, reorganization and modernization of public 
hospitals and to ensure their financial sustainability; and strengthening the 
national immunization program.” This version of PL155/1992S passed 
quickly through Congress between May and December, becoming Law 
100 on 23 December 1993.
Key characteristics of the Colombian legislature discussed above are 
evident in the process of legislating the PL155/1992S into Law 100 of 
1993. First, discussions within the legislature took place and a wide range 
of stakeholders had the opportunity to present proposals and put forward 
policy demands. Whilst the policy initiative came from the executive, the 
legislature became the central arena for these policy discussions. Indeed, 
the legislature managed to influence significantly the final outcome of the 
policy process (Uribe 2009). The vetoes to two government’s versions of 
PL 155/1992S within Commission VII confirms Saiegh’s (2010)  assertion 
that legislatures can be active players in policy making by being blunt veto 
players, forcing the executive to take alternative paths.
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Second, this process also shows that the different policy proposals were 
not submitted by the political parties with representation in the legisla-
ture, but by individual congressmen representing interest groups or social 
movements. This reflects Colombia’s weak party system and the “person-
alist” nature of political candidacies explained above.
Third, evidence from scientific research was available to (and thus 
potentially used by) decision makers and legislators. On the executive side 
in particular, the consultancy team from the Harvard School of Public 
Health provided a continuous flow of information and knowledge at 
demand from Londoño and his team. According to one of our interview-
ees, Londoño did not want “one-off consultancy” but continuous support 
in designing and implementing the law and in providing answers to policy 
questions [Interview 8]. Research produced by academic institutions and 
think tanks (i.e. Fedesarrollo) was also available to other key participants 
of the policy process.
As an attempt to generate knowledge to support the implementation of 
Law 100, the government set up the Program for Supporting the Health 
Reform (Programa de Apoyo a la Reforma de Salud, PARS) in 1996 with 
the financial and technical support of the Inter-American Development 
Bank. The Program aimed to provide technical assistance and capacity 
building, to produce specialised research and strategies to transfer such 
knowledge to decision-makers at the Ministry of Health. More than 100 
analytical studies and consultancy projects were developed until the pro-
gramme finished in 2008 (MPS and Gesaworld 2008). Alongside the 
PARS, the strategic policy documents produced by the National Council 
of Economic and Social Policies (Consejo Nacional de Políticas Económicas 
y Sociales, CONPES)3 on specific economic and social policy areas became 
a key tool to support decision making at the national level.
Despite these efforts, by 2001 the health system was facing a “severe 
and generalized financial crisis” leading to successive attempts to address 
these through reforms (Glassman et al. 2009: 7). A first wave of legislation 
designed to reform the health system was submitted to Congress in 2003 
and 2004, but none of it was ultimately passed (Hernández 2005). The 
first was draft law proposed to reform Law 100 was PL180/2004S, to 
which other projects such as PL236/2004S and PL241/2004S were lat-
ter added for joint discussion in Congress. Supporting evidence does not 
appear prominently in the preambles of the draft laws, with the exception 
3 DNP website, https://www.dnp.gov.co/CONPES/DocumentosConpes.aspx
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of PL180/2004s. However, the evidence is cited only in passing and with-
out an attempt to detailed engagement. The legislative term closed in 
June 2004 without these draft laws having progressed, and so they were 
abandoned (Hernández 2005).
In 2004, a second wave of 14 draft laws was submitted to Congress, 
starting with PL19/2004S and followed by others such as PL31/2004S 
and PL33/2004S. These and the rest of the 14-strong list were accumu-
lated to the PL52/2004S submitted by the government for parliamentary 
discussion. These stalled in Congress, where health insurers managed to 
orchestrate strong opposition, with the support of the Ministry of Finance. 
Furthermore, other legislative priorities such as pension reform and legis-
lation to allow the re-election of President Uribe relegated the importance 
of PL52/2004S, and it was ultimately abandoned (Guzmán 2006). Three 
of these draft laws– (PL52/2004S, PL31/2004S and PL33/2004S) did 
include discussion of relevant supporting evidence. Although watered 
down in terms of scope and depth of the reforms it proposed, PL52/2004S 
was well supported by research evidence, including most recent data from 
the 2003 National Health Survey (Encuesta Nacional de Salud), the 
Quality of Life National Survey (Encuesta Nacional de Calidad de Vida) 
and the 2004 CONPES document on social policy issues. More promi-
nently, PL31/2004S made use of extensive evidence from various sources: 
it brought in data from a 2003 CONPES and other official statistics (i.e. 
Ministry of Social Protection, SIVIGILA) as well as data from Pan- 
American Health Organization (PAHO) studies, the PARS studies, etc. 
National and international statistics were also referred to in PL33/2004S.
No further legislative initiatives were reintroduced in Congress until 
the summer 2006. The beginning of a new legislative term saw the regis-
tration of PL40/2006S in Senate [the twin draft law in Chamber of 
Representatives was PL2/2006C] to which 16 other draft laws – many 
registered by individual legislators – were progressively accumulated. Of 
all these draft laws, only two – PL116/2006S and PL122/2006S – drew 
on official statistics and linked arguments to published research, to sustain 
their proposals while the twin draft laws [PL40/2006S + PL2/2006C] 
registered by Minister of Social Protection, Diego Palacio, were not firmly 
grounded relevant evidence. PL40/2006S [+PL2/2006C] and its accu-
mulated projects were discussed over the second half of 2006 and approved 
in a joint commission debate in December, leading to the passage of Law 
1122 on 9 January 2007. The scope and aim of Law 1122 ultimately 
became to strengthen system regulations and de-judicialise health care, i.e. 
the tutela system of protection writs through which citizens are able to 
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seek access to health service via the courts (for a more detailed discussion 
of tutelas and the effects of judicialisation on evidence use see Hawkins 
and Alvarez Rosete 2017) (Restrepo 2007; Bernal et al. 2012: 25). Law 
1122 led to the creation of the Regulatory Commission for Health 
(Comisión de Regulación en Salud, CRES), a decision-making body at 
arm’s length affiliated to the Ministry of Health, with the role of updating 
the basket of benefits through the use of high quality evidence and a 
strong and transparent decision-making methodology. The creation of the 
CRES reveals the attempt to bring more evidence into the policy making 
process, although this too would be subject to later reform.
Ultimately, all these initiatives to address the sustainability of the health 
system stalled and “by the end of the decade, the health system was in 
deep crisis” (Bernal et al. 2012: 25) and with seemingly little prospect of 
reform. Scientific research was available to policy makers in Colombia and 
even informed the different draft laws submitted to Congress between 
1993 and 2010. However, none of these draft laws was able to pass suc-
cessfully through Congress. This suggests that while evidence was impor-
tant in informing policy debates, and proposed legislation, it was unable, 
in the context of deep politicization and embedded vested interests, to 
bring about effective reforms of health system and to relieve the mounting 
pressures it faced.
evIdence use In second Phase of health  
reforMs (2010–2016)
In the last month of President Uribe’s Presidency in July 2010, draft law 
PL01/2010S was registered in the Senate [along with its twin draft in the 
Chamber of Representatives PL106/2010C]. President Santos replaced 
Uribe as President with proposals for an ambitious programme of state 
reforms, to align the public administration with the goals of the 2010–2014 
National Development Plan (Strazza 2014). The reforms transformed the 
centre of government in Colombia and resulted in a step change in the 
availability of policy-relevant evidence, and the concern with evidence use 
in health policy making.
Draft laws PL1/2010S [+PL106/2010C] were discussed alongside 
another 10 draft laws accumulated to it, leading to the passage of Law 
1438 in January 2011. Only the preamble of PL01/2010S included refer-
ences to evidence. Nevertheless, Law 1438 regulated the setting up of the 
Institute of Health Technology Assessment (Instituto de Evaluación de 
Tecnologías Sanitarias, IETS), which was established in September 2012 
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and, only a few months later, in December 2012, the CRES was abolished 
and the Ministry of Health “re-assumed its role of resource-allocation 
decision-maker” (Castro 2014: 22, 131). As Dargent (2015) notes, the 
Santos reforms led experts and technocrats to “regain salience” at the 
Ministry of Health. According to Minister of Health Gaviria, the Ministry 
is now “a technocratic fortress”, in which “decisions are now made inde-
pendently of electoral politics” (Gaviria 2015). Whilst decision making of 
this kind is never completely apolitical, these claims speak to but a desire 
to introduce evidence into the decision making process more systemati-
cally and the potential for this to rationalise decision making processes.
During the second half of 2010 a new wave of reforms were introduced 
to Congress by different parliamentarians. Four draft statutory laws  – 
PLE186/2010S and the accumulated draft laws PLE189/2010S, 
PLE131/2010C and PLE198/2010S  – which aimed to define “the 
essential core of the right to health” were discussed in Parliament. Research 
evidence was provided in the preambles of 3 of the 4 draft laws submitted 
to Congress. PLE186/2010S analyses in detail the dramatic increase of 
health care costs and its causes, while PLE189/2010S included an exten-
sive commentary on the vision and recommendations of the World Health 
Report 2008 on primary care (WHR 2008). PLE198/2010S provided 
figures on equity and access to health services based upon official statistics, 
for example, and includes references to specialised literature to back up the 
proposals suggested. All these draft laws however did not complete the 
process in a single legislature and hence had to be abandoned.
A new window of opportunity for policy change opened up in the sum-
mer of 2012 with the submission to Congress of four draft statutory laws 
(PLE48/2012S; PLE59/2012C; PLE105/2012S; and PLE112/2012S) 
and one ordinary draft law (PL51/2012S, which was consequently accu-
mulated to PL210/2013S which came later). Of the four statutory laws, 
PLE48/2012S was informed by good quality research obtained from 
international comparisons, published studies and interviews with experts. 
PLE105/2012S and PLE112/2012S also referenced publications and 
official data, while PLE59/2012C did not mention any specific research.
With the impetus brought by the newly appointed Health Minister 
Gaviria, the government sought to take the initiative on the reform of the 
health system and develop both a Statutory Law and an Ordinary Law. On 
19 March 2013, the government registered two draft reform laws in 
Parliament: President Santos registered the draft Statutory Law PLE 
209/2013S at the Senate [and twin project PLE267/2013C at the Chamber] 
and Minister Gaviria registered the draft Ordinary Law PL210/2013S at the 
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Senate [and its twin project PL147/2013C at the Chamber]. Both 
PLE209/2013S [+PLE267/2013C] discussed in Commission I and 
PL210/2013S [+PL147/2013C] discussed in Commission VII were sup-
ported by extensive official statistics and underpinned arguments on pub-
lished research.
Draft Statutory Law PLE209/2013S was enacted on 16 February 
2015, became Statutory Law 1751. However, Ordinary Draft law 
PL210/2013S could not to be approved within two legislative periods 
and hence was abandoned. The re-election of President Santos in May 
2014, and the continuation in office of Minister of Health Gaviria, pre-
sented a second opportunity to pass legislation in a new legislative period. 
A new draft law PL77/2014S was registered on 29 August 2014 to bring 
back some of the financial instruments considered in the failed 
PL210/2013S.  Thus, PL77/2014S got accumulated to PL24/2014S 
[+PL109/2015C]. However, none of the proposed laws referred to scien-
tific evidence in their preambles. After a long legislative process, the proj-
ect was finally passed as Law 1797 on 13 July 2016.
conclusIon
The analysis of the more than 20-year long process of reforming Law 100 
shows that evidence can, and indeed did, inform health policies in a highly 
contested and fragmented political setting. The analysis of draft laws 
designed to reform the health system shows that policy relevant evidence 
was available to actors involved in reforming the health system and was used 
to inform a number of key draft laws submitted to parliament. We identified 
high levels of contestation and fragmentation at different levels of Colombian 
society: the social, political and policy levels, which provide the institutional 
context in which policy problems emerge and policy actors seek to address 
them. In this context, the availability of policy relevant evidence offers a 
potential means of circumventing and overcoming, political fragmentation 
and contestation. However, the deep seated nature of the vested interests in 
the Colombian health system and the health systems models which they 
favoured, meant that reform proposals were often stymied. Whilst it is not 
possible to depoliticize or solve policy dilemmas through recourse to evi-
dence alone, it is possible, at times, to use evidence as a means of generating 
consensus or providing the impetus towards compromise. To overcome the 
endemic problems of weak political and legislative structures, and engrained 
political cleavages, new bodies were formed which were tasked with the col-
lection, interpretation and deployment of policy relevant evidence.
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However, despite the institutionalised mechanisms of evidence genera-
tion and synthesis, the translation of research into policy and legislation 
remained limited and piecemeal. Many draft laws provided only minimal 
data on the extent of the problems facing the health system in Colombia, 
and their reform proposals were mostly based upon general commentaries 
of the functioning and challenges of the system (i.e. PL229/2010S; 
PLE59/2012C; PL51/2012S; PL233/2013S; etc.). A small number of 
other draft laws, which quoted academic studies to back up their analysis 
of the extent of the problem, tended however to refer to a biased selection 
of studies (that is, research which would fit their ideological stances; i.e. 
PLE105/2012S; PLE112/2012S). However, those draft laws submitted 
by the government, especially during the last phase of the reform, included 
extended empirical and analytical sections. For example, the 
PLE209/2013S and PL210/2013S provide a deep and wide analysis of 
the problems of the Colombian health system.
Reflecting the role of the legislature in Colombia’s highly contested 
political system and health policy subsystem, evidence cited in draft laws 
was unable to forge consensus amongst relevant policy actors over the 
direction of the health system reforms. The deep confrontations within 
the Colombian legislature did not facilitate political agreements nor play a 
constructive role in health policymaking. Scientific research was available 
and at the disposal of legislators, but it was unable to provide the common 
ground on which to overcome embedded policy positions and form the 
basis of compromise over the direction of health systems reforms.
annex 1: laws and draft laws revIewed
*underlined = preamble refers to/quotes research
1992–2010
1993–2002
• PLs that led to Law 100: PL155/1992S [+PL204/1992C]
2003–2004
• PL180/2004S and accumulated: PL236/2004S; PL238/2004S; 
PL241/2004S; PL242/2004S
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• PL52/2004S and accumulated: PL19/2004S; PL31/2004S; 
PL33/2004S; PL38/2004S; PL54/2004; PL57/2004S; 
PL58/2004S; PL98/2004S; PL105/2004S; PL115/2004S; 
PL122/2004S; PL151/2004S
2006–2007
• PLs that led to Law 1122: PL40/2006S [+PL2/2006C] and accu-
mulated PL20/2006S; PL26/2006S; PL38/2006S; PL67/2006S; 
PL116/2006S; PL122/2006S; PL128/2006S; PL143/2006S; 
PL1/2006C; PL18/2006C; PL84/2006C; PL130/2006C; 




• PLs that led to Law 1438: PL1/2010S [+PL106/2010C] and accu-
mulated: PL95/2010S; PL143/2010S; PL147/2010S; 
PL160/2010S; PL161/2010S; PL182/2010S; PL87/2010C, 
PL35/2010C; PL111/2010C; PL126/2010C




• PLE48/2012S and accumulated: PLE59/2012C; PLE105/2012S; 
PLE112/2012S;
2013–2014
• PLEs that led to Law 1751: PLE209/2013S [+PLE267/2013C]
• PL210/2013S [+PL147/2013C] and accumulated: PL233/2013S; 
PL51/2012S
2014–2016
• PLs that led to Law 1797: PL77/2014S and accumulated PL24/2014S 
[+PL109/2015C]
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